Operations Management Assignment/ one page
APA REFERENCE
Inventory is a necessary element for customer service. However, it implies an additional cost that can become unsustainable for an organization.
Read the article inventory – INVENTORY – DRIVEN COSTS *pls view attached *and answer the following questions:
- Is HP’s focus on minimizing inventory costs is feasible for a company operating in a market where delivery speed is an order-winning factor?
- Would you pay a premium for a product or service price for an earlier delivery? For which type of products or services?
Calloni, G., de Montgros, X., Slagmulder, R., Van Wassenhove, L., Wright, L. (2005). Inventory-Driven Costs. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from: https://hbr.org/2005/03/inventory-driven-cost
ECONOMY
by Gianpaolo Callioni, Xavier de Montgros, Regine Slagmulder, Luk N. Van Wassenhove, and Linda
Wright
FROM THE MARCH 2005 ISSUE
he 1990s were hard for the PC business. Although demand grew �vefold between 1990 and
1997, the products had become household staples, and it was di cult for companies to
di!erentiate their o!erings.
Hewlett-Packard came out better than many. The computer hardware giant slashed prices on all of
its PCs: 10% in 1991, another 26% in 1992, and yet another 22% in 1993. At the same time, it
revamped its design, planning, and production processes to shorten cycle times, respond quickly to
changes in demand, and move inventory to the right location as it was needed. By late 1999, HP had
displaced IBM as the world’s third-largest PC manufacturer in terms of revenue, behind Dell and
Compaq.
But for all its success in maintaining market share, HP was struggling to turn a dollar. By 1997,
margins on its PCs were as thin as a silicon wafer, and some product lines had not turned a pro�t
since 1993. Price cuts made formerly insigni�cant costs critical—computer manufacturers simply
could not stock up on components or any other inventory. Any excess at the end of a product’s short
life had to be written o!, further eroding margins. Adding to the pressure, constant technology
advances made new products obsolete in as few as six months. A common rule of thumb was that
the value of a fully assembled PC decreased at the rate of 1% a week. Although HP’s supply chains
were 4exible and responsive enough to deliver the PCs when and where customers wanted them,
they were not economically sustainable.
Compounding the problem, company executives realized, was the fact that HP’s management-
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accounting metrics had failed to keep pace with the evolution of its supply chains. HP now oversaw
a complex, multitiered manufacturing network made up of many disparate entities. But the
company’s current approach to cost measurement allowed individual players in the chain to see
only their piece of the puzzle, making it impossible for them to assess the overall dollar impact of
their local decisions. They could not see the e!ects of operational decisions like setting the size of
bu!er inventory between two sections of the production process. Nor could they assess the impact
of such strategic decisions as choosing to locate a �nal assembly plant close to a particular supplier.
If the company wanted to design sustainable supply chains, it needed to give all its managers a
direct line of sight to the overall bottom line.
The Hidden Cost of Inventory
To make the PC business more cost competitive, HP’s Strategic Planning and Modeling (SPaM)
group, led by Corey Billington, undertook an exhaustive review of the PC business’s overall cost
structure in 1997. It soon became clear that mismatches between demand and supply leading to
excess inventory were themain drivers of PC costs; in 1995, for example, costs related to inventory
had equaled the PC business’s total operating margin. It was just as clear that the division’s existing
cost metrics did not track all of HP’s inventory-driven costs (IDC), pieces of which were often mixed
in with other cost items, scattered over di!erent functions and geographic locations, and recorded
at di!erent times using di!erent accounting conventions.
The most readily identi�able component of inventory-driven costs is the traditional inventory cost
item, usually de�ned as the “holding cost of inventory,” which covers both the capital cost of money
tied up in inventory and the physical costs of having inventory (warehouse space costs, storage
taxes, insurance, rework, breakage, spoilage). At HP, however, the holding cost accounted for less
than 10% of total inventory-driven costs. SPaM’s investigation revealed four other inventory-driven
cost items at HP’s PC business. And each of them needed to be managed in a distinct way.
Excess inventory was the main driver of Hewlett-Packard’s PC costs; one year, in fact, inventory-driven costs equaled the PC business’s total operating margin.
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Component Devaluation Costs.
According to SPaM’s calculations, these accounted for the lion’s share of HP’s inventory costs. Key
components such as microprocessor chips and memory typically drop in price quickly and steeply.
The price of a CPU, for instance, might fall as much as 40% during its nine-month life cycle, and the
penalties for holding excess parts when a price drop occurred could be enormous. Back in 1997,
however, few electronic hardware makers had realized just how perishable their goods had become,
and HP, in common with many others, maintained inventory in several places—in factories and
distribution centers, in merge centers, in transit. Every time the component prices fell, HP was hit
with another devaluation cost at each of these points in the value chain.
HP had no control over component prices, but it could control how much inventory it was holding.
That meant reducing the number of nodes in the supply chain, consolidating manufacturing
facilities, taking possession of components on a just-in-time basis, paying the going price at that
time, and working with suppliers to minimize inventory when a price drop was anticipated.
Price Protection Costs.
If HP dropped the market price of a product after units had already been shipped to a sales channel,
it had to reimburse its channel partners for the di!erence for any units that had not yet sold, so the
channel partner didn’t have to sell at a loss. Given how quickly value decayed, this mismatched
inventory exposed HP to big price protection risks. A channel partner might buy a product from HP
when the prevailing market price was $1,000. But if the item sold �ve weeks later at a new price of
$950, HP had to reimburse the $50 di!erence. To limit this cost, HP had to be certain that channel
partners’ inventory never exceeded the minimum number of days required to ensure the desired
availability, so that no excess inventory had to be protected.This meant that Hewlett-Packard had to
keep its manufacturing turnaround times short and replenishment cycles frequent. HP also o!ered
its channel partners incentives to carry the lower levels of inventory. Analysis showed that the cost
of these incentives was almost always lower than the cost of reimbursing channel partners after
price breaks.
Product Return Costs.
In a sense, product return costs are simply 100% price protection costs; distributors can simply
return unsold goods to the manufacturer for a full refund. In some cases, product returns
constituted more than 10% of the product’s revenue, not because of product failures but because
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resellers were returning excess inventory. Apart from incurring the operational costs (shipping,
handling, product retesting, and the like), returns lengthened the time a product spent in the supply
chain before reaching an end user, increasing HP’s exposure to additional devaluation risks and
inventory �nance costs. To manage this type of inventory-driven cost, HP had to work closely with
channel partners to optimize the whole supply chain. By agreeing with its channel partners on
speci�c inventory levels and delivery expectations, HP reduced ine cient inventory in the channel
and increased its overall quality of service both to partners and end customers.
Obsolescence Costs.
End-of-life write-o!s were initially the most obvious portion of this cost. PC life cycles being so
short, even a small miscalculation in anticipated demand could leave the company holding stacks of
worthless goods that had to be written o!. The other related but sometimes less obvious
components of obsolescence costs were discounts on about-to-be-discontinued products and the
associated marketing e!ort required to accelerate their sale. These costs are typically not included
in a company’s cost of goods sold and, although HP executives took these discounts and marketing
costs into account when making decisions about discontinuing product lines, they seldom
considered them when determining the real cost of inventory. To avoid obsolescence costs, HP had
to be very e cient in managing product introductions, so that new models were launched just as
the last remaining units of the old models sold out.
On the whole, calculating these components of inventory costs is fairly straightforward. The
simplest to determine is devaluation, which can be �gured by multiplying the inventory level of the
product or component in question by the proper devaluation rate. Suppose that a hypothetical
company sells a consumer electronic item that devalues at a yearly rate of 60%. Average annual
inventory related to the product is worth $200 million, and annual revenues from selling the
product are $1 billion. Then, the yearly inventory-related cost due to product devaluation is the
average annual inventory multiplied by the devaluation rate, or $120 million. Dividing that �gure by
revenues gives us the cost as a margin, in this case 12%. Clearly, at any given devaluation rate,
inventory costs will increase directly as inventory increases. The faster prices fall, the more the
inventory-driven costs rise as inventory increases. Since in most cases the devaluation rate is
outside managerial control, the only way to reduce the impact of devaluation on pro�ts is to do a
better job of matching demand and supply, thereby shrinking inventories.
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Tracing Costs to the Source
Price protection and return costs are calculated in a similar way, but the actual sums are somewhat
more complicated because they depend on the contractual agreements set up between
manufacturers and distributors. In its simplest case, if a manufacturer has agreed to reimburse its
distributors 100% whenever it lowers its list price, the formula for determining price protection
costs is the price drop times the number of units of the product in distributors’ inventory. Similarly,
return costs would be the number of items returned of a particular product times the wholesale
price paid by the retailer in the �rst place. But those sums need to be adjusted by the contract terms,
which might, for example, not allow all inventory to be returned if the retailer deliberately
overstocks. (The more generous the price-protection and return terms, the less the distributor will
lose by doing so.) What’s more, contract enforcement may depend on speci�c circumstances. For
example, even if the contract constrains the return options of the channel partner, HP may still
agree to take products back to maintain good relations and secure future sales.
Devaluation, price protection, and return costs are essentially continuous costs; they occur all the
time and can be calculated at any point. Obsolescence costs, however, are discrete, arising only
when a company decides to retire a particular product and therefore cannot be estimated until that
moment. The amount of obsolescence costs is determined by several factors. First, the company
needs to write o! 100% of the value of �nished goods in its inventories (less any recycling or scrap
bene�ts). Then it must write down the value of any components in the pipeline. If components are
product speci�c, they will have to be written o! 100%; those that can be used elsewhere will be
subject to devaluation costs depending on how quickly they can be transferred to other products.
Finally, the company has to add in the related marketing and discounting costs of selling o!
about-to-be discontinued products in �re sales.
As important as identifying the various hidden components of inventory costs was to HP, even more
powerful was understanding how the impact of each IDC component di!ered for di!erent products.
That had profound implications for the way HP managed its product portfolio. This insight is
illustrated in the table “Tracing Costs to the Source,” which compares three unnamed HP products.
Total IDC is relatively high for product A, at 14.25% of product revenues, and fully half of this total
comes from price protection costs. Total IDC for product C, by contrast, is only 4.80% of revenues,
and the largest share of that is component devaluation.
These �gures suggest how the supply chains of
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When the components of inventory costs are
broken out, it becomes easy to see how the supply
chains of different products need to be adjusted
in different ways to lower costs at their source. In
this example of three of Hewlett-Packard’s
products, the highest costs for product A are
coming from goods whose prices have dropped
after they’ve been shipped to retailers. But the
greatest problem for products B and C are drops
in component prices before the products ever get
out of the factory.
the three products need to be managed. Since the
inventories of channel partners represent the
largest component of inventory costs for product
A, what managers need to do is improve supply
chain management downstream: They must do a
better job of forecasting demand. They need to
encourage vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and
collaborative planning, forecasting, and
replenishment (CPFR) initiatives. By contrast,
products B and C probably need better upstream
management with suppliers or with product
designers to reduce component devaluation risks.
The four cost items that SPaM identi�ed are not
the only kinds of potential inventory-driven costs.
Companies that maintain high stocks of raw
materials, for instance, may well �nd that the write-down in the value of their inventory, stemming
from reductions in raw material prices, can in any one year outweigh the bene�ts of the lower input
prices. Another common source of IDC are price discounts, which typically arise when errors in
forecasting demand lead to excess inventory that the company is forced to sell at below-market
prices, resulting in lower margins on the products in question.
The Turnaround
The Mobile Computing Division (MCD) was the �rst of Hewlett-Packard’s PC units to take inventory-
driven costs into account when formulating strategy. In 1998, before redesigning its supply chain,
MCD was taping dollars to every machine it shipped. Year after year, its managers tried di!erent
initiatives to improve pro�ts, including reducing the cost of materials, controlling operating
expenses, and generating revenue growth through new product development. Nothing worked until
the notebook division began to look at the impact of its supply chain decisions on IDC.
Intuitively, MCD’s managers believed that the unit could not become pro�table until it consolidated
all worldwide manufacturing at a single location and shipped the �nished products directly to
customers. This would, however, represent a major strategic change, and the division’s executives
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Finding the Lowest-Cost Option
Breaking out inventory-driven costs gave HP’s
Mobile Computing Division a far more
comprehensive understanding of the various
supply chain options it was considering. Scenario
1 represents the existing cost structure of the
unit’s business in 1998, in which products were
manufactured centrally and configured to
conform to local needs in regional markets.
Scenario 5 is the centralized one-step
manufacturing model that HP eventually
adopted. Its merits do not become apparent until
inventory-driven costs are taken into account.
worried that centralized manufacturing would a!ect the unit’s ability to give customers the service
they wanted, resulting in the loss of both market share and revenue. To build a compelling case for
making the move, they needed to quantify the risk—and the opportunity—involved in making such a
radical change.
Collaborating with SPaM, the MCD team considered many di!erent supply chain scenarios. The
exhibit “Finding the Lowest-Cost Option” compares �ve of these. For reasons of con�dentiality, the
actual numbers have been disguised, but the exhibit truthfully reveals the relative cost di!erences.
Scenario 1 represents the original con�guration, a two-step supply chain with a central
manufacturing facility and a certain amount of local product con�guration carried out at regional
facilities. It turns out that about 40% of the true total supply chain cost in this scenario is linked to
inventory. The company had never taken inventory costs such as devaluation and obsolescence fully
into account before, so the exercise revealed just how expensive its past supply chain decisions had
actually been.
Scenarios 2 and 3 essentially retain the basic
two-step supply chain con�guration of scenario 1
but assume that the company will limit inventory
costs by putting more-e cient manufacturing
processes in place and by passing on to supply
chain partners as much responsibility as possible
for inventories. As the exhibit shows, these
nonstrategic changes would su ce to reduce total
costs (including IDC) by as much as 24%. In
scenarios 4 and 5, the unit considered radically
restructuring its supply chain, and either
approach would involve major strategic changes
to implement. Both are essentially one-step
supply chains, but there the similarities end.
Scenario 4 assumes that HP would have several
regional factories doing both manufacturing and
localized con�gurations. In scenario 5, however,
everything would be done in a single central
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factory and airfreighted directly to customers
worldwide. What this means is that scenario 4 has
higher manufacturing costs than scenario 5 but lower freight costs.
How should the Mobile Computing Division choose between the scenarios? In terms of
manufacturing costs only, scenario 5, which MCD called International Direct Ship, is the best option,
suggesting that the company should consider making the radical change to a one-step supply chain.
Factoring in freight, the one-step model remains the theoretically optimal supply chain, although
scenario 4, with regional factories, now appears to be the best option. But the case for switching to a
one-step model is considerably undermined because scenario 3, the best-case two-step option, is
now only one percentage point more expensive than scenario 4 and actually cheaper than scenario
5. The one percentage point di!erence is not enough to make up for the organizational and �nancial
changes that switching to a one-step supply chain would involve, despite the tight margins on the
PC business.
But what a di!erent picture emerges when IDCs such as inventory devaluation and obsolescence
costs are fully quanti�ed and included in the analysis. Then, the case for switching to a one-step
supply chain looks much stronger. Even if the company were to exploit all the possible opportunities
for reducing IDC in the current supply chain structure, as scenario 3 rather unrealistically assumes,
both one-step scenarios come out about four percentage points cheaper, which is enough to justify
management’s case for switching to a one-step supply chain. A full assessment of IDC, therefore, not
only revealed the limitations of MCD’s current supply chain but also provided strong evidence that
the only way the division could turn its business around was by refashioning its entire supply chain
strategy.
IDC considerations also drove the choice between the unit’s two very di!erent one-step supply
chain alternatives. As the exhibit shows, the total cost di!erence between them, when IDCs were
taken into account, was minimal (0.2 percentage points). But managers felt that scenario 4 o!ered
many opportunities for losing control of inventory-driven costs, and it was not clear that MCD would
always be able to contain those risks. Managing a multitude of regional factories with separate pools
of materials and products is harder than managing just the one. More factories would mean greater
chances that capacity would fall idle; several plants would certainly require higher levels of capital
investment than a single one. And when MCD introduced new products, several factories would
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have to ramp up their production processes, not just one. So, although scenarios 4 and 5 seemed to
be very similar in terms of base-case total costs, the Mobile Computing Division eventually plumped
for scenario 5.
MCD started reaping the bene�ts almost at once. Inventory-driven costs dropped from 18.7% of
total revenue in 1997 to 12.2% in 1998. In 1999, the division saw an even more dramatic
improvement, as IDC dropped to a mere 3.8% of revenue. These reductions translated directly into
savings for the notebook division’s bottom line, which in 1998 broke even and in 1999 turned
pro�table. The IDC metrics enabled the Mobile Computing Division to clearly identify exactly where
changes to its supply chain were needed and to justify changes that, according to more traditional
thinking, would not have made sense.
Other PC units, notably the commercial desktop business, started to follow MCD’s approach to
costing in their supply chain decisions, with similarly impressive results. Inspired by these
successes, HP decided to o cially implement the new metrics in all of its PC operations. In the �rst
stage of the rollout, the focus was on tracking IDC across all divisions. In some cases, the
information had to be assembled manually; in others, it was possible to automate the data
gathering. In the next stage, goals for each IDC line item were set for each region and product line,
based on projects that were known to be in the works and estimates of future market conditions. A
consistent presentation of the data was almost as important as the actual data. HP’s regional units,
product divisions, and �nance groups worked closely together to develop a standard template for
supply chain metrics, making sure that the data could be collected in the requested format for each
line item in a timely manner. So everyone uses the same line items on their spreadsheets, each with
the same de�nition, the same source of information, and the same method of calculation. As a
result, all users can look at a line item and know exactly where the data came from and what they
really mean.
The Payoff
HP can now manage the pro�tability of its value chain in a much more sophisticated way. Gone are
the days of across-the-board measures like “Everyone must cut inventories by 20% by the end of
the year,” which would usually result in a sometimes counterproductive 4urry of cookie-cutter lean
production and just-in-time initiatives. Now each product group is free to choose the supply chain
con�guration that best suits its needs as long as it meets the global IDC target. Product group
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managers may well have known before, on an intuitive level, what they needed to do, but the IDC
metrics have made it easier for them to convince senior managers that their particular situations
require particular solutions.
Incorporating the IDC metrics into decision making has also saved managers from moves that make
perfect sense for their own unit but add to overall costs. Previously, for example, a manager might
have decided against shipping goods by air because the extra transportation costs would have
exceeded the identi�able cost of �nancing and warehousing local inventory. But that decision would
have imposed costs elsewhere in the supply chain, which might well have exceeded the extra
transportation costs. Without measuring total IDC, there was no way to know that, and even if the
manager made the right decision, he would probably have been penalized for it. Now, however, he
would be rewarded for incurring extra local cost in the interests of reducing total costs.
The IDC metrics are valuable in a whole range of R&D and marketing decisions. Many downstream
supply chain costs arise because of choices managers make upstream in the product design phase.
The IDC discipline has made HP’s product designers much more aware of the consequences of their
decisions, which makes them more responsible and accountable. Before, someone who had
speci�ed a hard drive that took three months to obtain would probably not have realized that during
those months HP was liable for excess inventory, devaluation, and obsolescence costs. Now, such a
designer no longer has that excuse. The IDC metrics also help managers decide how much 4exibility
to build into new products. In the past, HP often underestimated the related supply chain costs of
o!ering lots of product features. Being able to quantify the real inventory-driven cost of adding, say,
Lithuanian language customization to a product helps in determining whether or not to o!er
customers that option.
But perhaps the greatest bene�t of the IDC metrics is that they link operational decisions to
corporate goals for creating shareholder value. In the new pro�t-focused climate, HP has been
abandoning its traditional �nancial-performance metric of return on sales in favor of return on net
assets (RONA). This re4ects the competitive reality that, for companies like HP, advantage derives
less from market share than from how e ciently the �rm manages its assets—in other words, its
supply chain. As the exhibit “Linking Inventory Costs to Financial Performance” shows, the
relationship between inventory-driven costs and return on net assets is direct, simple, and powerful,
which makes it far easier to align the interests and decisions of managers up and down the
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Linking Inventory Costs to Financial Performance
Hewlett-Packard is finding that return on net
assets (RONA) is a more accurate measure of
shareholder value than market share, because in
such price-sensitive industries, the key to
financial health is not revenue growth but sound
asset management. To measure RONA accurately,
companies need to track more than just
traditional inventory costs. Those costs affect
expenses only, but the price protection and
product return costs that inventory-driven cost
metrics track can also erode revenues. What’s
more, lowering inventory-driven costs can not
only decrease total costs and raise revenues but
also lower working capital requirements by
reducing the number of days of inventory
outstanding.
hierarchy.
The �nancial bene�ts have come quickly. HP’s
Personal Systems Group, for example, saw
worldwide inventory decline by 50% between
2000 and 2002, and it has maintained that level
ever since. Costs associated with inventory have
dropped even further, by some 70%. Since HP’s
merger with Compaq in May 2002, the push to
adopt IDC companywide has moved forward. At
this point, all of HP has adopted a standard set of
inventory-driven cost metrics.• • •
Hewlett-Packard isn’t the only company, of
course, that operates in a dynamic, highly price-
competitive industry. Consumer electronics,
fashion producers, and fresh-goods retailers all
face similar challenges. Any company with low
margins, short life cycles, highly perishable or
seasonal products, and unpredictable demand
needs to track the various components of its
inventory-driven costs. Without appropriate
performance metrics to help visualize the
magnitude of their supply chain problems and to
prompt people to take action, these �rms will simply not know if they are leaving hefty piles of
money on the table.
A version of this article appeared in the March 2005 issue of Harvard Business Review.
Gianpaolo Callioni (gianpaolo_callioni@hp.com) is the director of supply chain strategy and planning at Hewlett-Packard in
Palo Alto, California.
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Xavier de Montgros (xavier_de-montgros@hp.com) is the supply chain development director of HP’s Personal Systems
Group.
Regine Slagmulder (regine.slagmulder@insead.edu) is an associate professor at Insead in Fontainebleau, France.
Luk N. Van Wassenhove is the Henry Ford Chair of Manufacturing at INSEAD and director of the Humanitarian
Research Group. He is also an Academic Fellow at the European Center for Executive Development (CEDEP).
Linda Wright (linda_wright@hp.com) is a finance manager in HP’s Personal Systems Group.
Related Topics: OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT | SUPPLY CHAIN
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